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PRINCIPAL TAX CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
SALE OF REAL ESTATEt
J. NELSON YOUNG*
There is probably nothing more commonplace in the general practice
of law than the handling of a real estate transaction. It is also doubtful
whether any transaction is more replete with tax pitfalls. By anticipating
the tax potentialities of a real estate transaction, the attorney may preserve
a substantial portion of the profit on the sale or turn an unprofitable sale
into a welcome tax-saving. It is the scope of this article to outline some of
the income tax factors to be considered by an attorney in advising a client
in the sale of real estate.
CONTROLLING THE YEAR OF TAX-CLOSING
In the first instance, it is within the power of the vendor to control
the taxable year in which the transaction is closed. In this manner, the
vendor may allocate a taxable gain or a deductible loss to the period which
will produce a minimum tax cost or a maximum tax-saving. He may desire
to off-set gains and losses in the same year; he may wish to carry-over an
advantageous tax deduction; he may wish to shift taxable gain to a period
of lesser income or lower tax rates; or he may desire to extend the holding
period of the property to obtain the benefit of a long term capital gain.
This power is inherent in the rule established by Lucas v. Nortk Texas
Lwmber Co.," namely, that a real estate transaction is not closed for tax
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
tThis article is taken for the most part from a paper delivered before the Real
Property Division, Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, at the annual
meeting of the American Bar Association, September 26, 1951, New York, N. Y.
Proceedings, Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, American Bar
Association 4 (1951). In both that paper and this article, the author has leaned
heavily upon an earlier excursion into this area. See: Young, Tax Problems in Real
Estate Transactions, 1949 U. OF ILL. LAW FORUM 473.
1. 281 U.S. 11 (1930). On December 27, 1916, the taxpayer granted a ten
day option to purchase its timber lands. The option was exercised on December 30,
but a deed was not tendered and possession was not relinquished until January 5,
(117)
1
Young: Young: Principal Tax Considerations
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1952
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
purposes until there has been either a transfer of title or a relinquishment
of possession to the purchaser. If neither of these events have occurred, there
is no gain to be reported or loss to be deducted.2 Conversely, the occurrence
of either event will have the effect of concluding the transaction tax-wise.
Thus, the retention of titles or possession 4 after the occurrence of the other
event does not serve to delay the tax closing.
The rule is a sound one and is solidly premised on the principle that
no gain or loss should be recognized for tax purposes until there is reason-
able certainty that the transaction will be fully executed.5 Even though
there is a binding contract, until delivery of a deed or relinquishment of
possession, there is a possibility that the transaction might be rescinded by
mutual agreement or fail of execution by reason of a defect in title. By
holding the transaction open for tax purposes until there is an unequivocal
event in the execution of the contract, unrealistic tax consequences are
avoided.6
The requirement of delivery of a-deed or transfer of possession as a
condition precedent to the tax-closing of a real estate transaction is appli-
cable to both cash and accrual basis taxpayers. The receipt of a down pay-
ment prior to the occurrence of either of the requisite events does not alter
the general rule. It enables the vendor currently to consummate a binding
contract and accept a substantial part of the consideration without incurring
tax liability.7
Where the vendor wishes to carry a gain or loss over to the following
year, he may execute a contract, accept a down payment and provide for
relinquishment of possession and transfer of title during the subsequent
year. Both parties can be amply protected by placing the vendor's deed
1917. The taxpayer, being on the accrual basis, reported the gain on the transaction
in its return for 1916. It was held that the gain should have been reported in 1917
since that was the year in which the vendee became unconditionally liable for the
purchase price.
2. Bourne v. Comm'r, 62 F. 2d 648 (4th Cir. 1933).
3. Comm'r v. Union Pac. R. R., 86 F. 2d 637 (2d Cir. 1936).
4. Ohio Brass Co., 17 B. T. A. 1199 (1929) (personal property).
5. It has been suggested that a binding contract is a sufficient basis for
accrual of the gain on the sale of real estate. MAGILL, TAXABLE INcOME 212 (Rev.
ed. 1945).
6. If a -binding contract standing alone closed the transaction tax-wise, the
gain would be reportable in the year of contract subject to the applicable account-
ing method. It would follow that if the transaction fell through in the following
year, when title and possession were scheduled for delivery, the vendor would
suffer a deductible loss. United States v. Lewis, 340 U. S. 590 (1951).
7. Bourne v. Comm'r, supra note 2.
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and the balance of the vendee's consideration in escrow to be released con-
currently on a specified possession date scheduled in the subsequent taxable
period." If the vendor wishes to accelerate the tax closing and report the
transaction in the contract year he has two alternatives. He may immed-
iately transfer possession and place his deed in escrow to be delivered upon
full payment of the purchase priceY If possession cannot be conveniently
relinquished, he can conclude the transaction by currently delivering a deed
to the purchaser with possession to follow in a subsequent period.10
In some transactions, circumstances render it impossible to finally de-
termine the contract price in the contract year. This is likely to occur in
the sale of a large tract of land where the price per acre is agreed upon, but
final computation of the total price is deferred pending completion of a
survey to establish the exact acreage. Unless a subsequent adjustment
substantially alters the estimated contract price, relinquishment of posses-
sion or delivery of a deed will serve to close the transaction in the year of
contract."1
Finally, there are instances where the transaction is closed except that
a portion of the contract price is placed in escrow to protect the purchaser
against additional expenses or costs such as defects in title. In that case,
none of the proceeds placed in escrow constitute income until released
to the vendor.12
SELECTING THE METHOD OF REPORTING GAIN
The closing of a profitable transaction often presents the taxpayer
with a choice of accounting methods for reporting the gain thereon. This
is true, however, only where payment of part of the purchase price is de-
ferred to subsequent periods. If the entire consideration is paid in the year
of closing, the entire gain is reportable in that year. Where payments on the
purchase price are deferred, both the cash and accrual basis vendor may
8. C. S. Chapman, 7 T. C. M. 88 (1948).
9. Comm'r v. Union Pac. R.R., suspra note 3; Harris Trust and Savings
Bank, Ex'r., 24 B. T. A. 498 (1931)
10. Ohio Brass Co., supra note 4.
11. Frost Lumber Industries v. Comm'r, 128 F. 2d 693 (5th Cir. 1942);
Helvering v. Nibley-Mimnaugh Lumber Co., 70 F. 2d 843 (D. C. Cir. 1934);
Comm'r v. R. J. Darnell, Inc., 60 F. 2d 82 (6th Cir. 1932). In the last case, the
subsequent adjustment reduced the gain by approximately fifty per cent. It was
held that the transaction was not closed until the contract price was finally de-
termined.
12. Stoner v. Conm'r, 79 F. 2d 75 (3rd Cir. 1935), cert. denied sub nom.
Helvering v. Stoner, 296 U. S. 650 (1935).
1952]
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wish to bring the transaction within the provisions governing the installment
method. If the transaction does not qualify for installment treatment, the
cash method is the only method left for the cash basis taxpayer, but it
provides a possible third alternative for the accrual basis taxpayer. Where
the cash method is followed, consideration should be given to the tax conse-
quences of accepting the purchaser's notes and mortgage as security for
the balance of the purchase price.
Cask inethod. If the vendor is on a cash basis, the general rule is that
he reports no gain until he has fully recovered, in cash or other property,
the basis or tax cost of the property sold. But in applying this rule, it should
be remembered that the purchaser's notes, bonds, or mortgages taken as
security for the deferred payments under the contract, are treated as the
equivalent of cash to the extent of their present market value.13 Thus, even
though the down payment is small, if the balance of the purchase price is
secured by any of the foregoing instruments, substantially all the gain on
the transaction may fall in the year of closing rather than subsequent years
as desired by the taxpayer.
There is an additional risk of increasing the tax cost in this situation. It
arises where the original transaction results in capital gain and the discount-
able value of the vendee's obligations is substantially less than face value.
The purchaser's obligations are treated as property acquired by the vendor
with a basis equal to their discountable value at the time of closing. Upon
collection at maturity, the difference between the face value and the dis-
countable value will be taxed as ordinary income.14 This is true since the
collection of a debt does not constitute the sale or exchange of a capital
asset. The foregoing tax consequences can be obviated by requiring the
vendee, under the terms of the contract, to make his notes and mortgage
payable to a trustee with the provision that the proceeds be distributed
to the vendor upon collection. Since the vendor would not have power to
dispose of the purchaser's obligations, this would preclude inclusion of the
value of the notes and mortgage in determining gain on the transaction in
13. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.44-4 (1943). If the purchaser's obligations
have no market value, no portion thereof will be included in determining gain
realized in the year of closing. Fidelity Savings & Loan Co., 44 B. T. A. 471 (1941).
14. A. B. Culbertson, 14 T. C. 1421 (1950); Victor B. Gilbert, 6 T. C. 10(1946). If the purchaser's obligations had no market value at the time received,
this risk does not exist. In that case, the character of the gain upon collection
will be the same as if full payment had been received at the time of closing. A. B.
Culbertson, supra at 1423.
[Vol. 17
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the year of closing and would avoid realization of ordinary income upon
subsequent collection. This procedure may be desirable in those transac-
tions which do not qualify for the installment method.
The same tax result can be obtained if the vendor is willing to accept
the vendee's mere contractual obligation without the security of notes,
bonds, or mortgages. A mere contractual obligation standing alone is not
treated as the equivalent of cash or as property having a present market
value regardless of the strength of the purchaser's credit.15 This principle
was re-affirmed in a recent Tax Court decision.16 In 1945, the taxpayer sold
an "inn," as a going concern, consisting of real estate, equipment, furnish-
ings and fixtures. The sale price was $70,000 and the taxpayer's basis, in
round figures, was $26,500. The purchaser made a down payment of $8,000.
By the terms of the contract, which was the only evidence of the purchaser's
obligation, the balance was payable over a period of several years. The
vendor was on a cash basis and reported no gain on the sale until 1947,
the year in which he had fully recovered his basis. The Commissioner as-
sessed a deficiency for the year 1945 on the ground that the purchaser's
obligation was proyerty (other than money) received by the taxpayer
which had a fair market value equivalent to cash. In holding for the tax-
payer, the court stated:1 7
"In determining what obligations are the 'equivalent of cash' the
requirement has always been that the obligation, like money, be
freely and easily negotiable so that it readily passes from hand to
hand in commerce .... In the case before us the promise to pay
was merely contractual; it was not embodied in a note or other
evidence of indebtedness possessing the element of negotiability
and freely transferable. It is true that the contract possessed
many elements of a mortgage ... but this characteristic does not
lend to the contract the necessary element of negotiability."
Accrual method. In accordance with sound principles of accrual ac-
counting, an accrual basis taxpayer reports the entire gain on a transaction
in the year of closing17a This is so whether the consideration is received in
the year of closing or is deferred to subsequent periods. But in the Titus
15. Bedell v. Comm'r, 30 F. 2d 622 (2d Cir. 1929).
16. Nina J. Ennis, 17 T. C. 465 (1951).
17. Id. at 470.
17a. For the accrual basis taxpayer, "it is the right to receive and not the actual
receipt that determines the inclusion of the amount in gross income." Spring City
Foundry Co. v. Comm'r, 292 U.S. 182, 184 (1934).
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case,18 the Tax Court held that an accrual basis taxpayer may elect the
cash (or deferred payment) method of reporting gain on sale of an interest
in real estate. The decision is a questionable one in that it is contrary
to generally accepted concepts of accrual accounting. Furthermore, the
Commissioner has entered his non-acquiesence. Nevertheless, the case is
highly significant. At first the court held that since the taxpayer was on the
accrual basis and since the transaction did not qualify as an installment sale,
the entire gain should be reported in the year of closing."9
Later the court granted a rehearing in which it reversed its original
position and allowed the taxpayer to follow the cash method. Its final
position was premised on the conclusion that the regulations, by long stand-
ing provision, have authorized the deferred payment method of reporting
gain on the sale of real estate without regard to the method of accounting
regularly employed by the taxpayer.20 This decision has been cited with
approval in several recent cases.21 It should not be overlooked where an
accrual basis taxpayer can use the cash method to advantage.
Installment imethod. The installment method of reporting gain on the
sale of real estate is an alternative method expressly authorized by Internal
Revenue Code Section 44. By this method, the gain is allocated propor-
tionately to the payments made by the vendee and is spread over the entire
period of the contract. It is available to both cash and accrual basis tax-
payers, whether dealers or non-dealers, and is applicable to all real estate
transactions regardless of amount. Where the taxpayer has consummated
several qualifying transactions in the same taxable period, he is free to elect
the installment method with respect to any one, several, or all of his sales.
He is not bound, by an election as to one or more sales, to apply the install-
ment method to all transactions. 2 Election of the installment method must
be made in the return for the year of sale.23 Failure to elect at that time
constitutes a waiver of the right to utilize the installment method.24
To qualify for the installment method, the "initial payments" must not
18. 33 B. T. A. 928 (1936), Non-Acq., XV-1 CuM. BULL. 46 (1936).
19. 32 B. T. A. 1222 (1935).
20. 33 B. T. A. 928, 930 (1935).
21. The most recent is Nina J. Ennis, supra note 16.
22. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)(11) 1943); G.C.M. 3350, VIII- CuM.
BULL. 62 (1928).
23. Cedar Valley Distillery, Inc., 16 T.C. 870 (1951); Sylvia S. Strauss, 33
B. T. A. 855 (1935).
24. Pac. Nat. Co. v. Welch, 304 U S. 191 (1938).
[Vol. 17
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exceed thirty percent of the total selling price.25 As defined by statute, the
term "initial payments" means "payments received [in the year of closing]
in cash or property other than evidences of indebtedness" executed by the
purchaser.2 Consequently, the vendor may. accept a purchaser's installment
notes, bonds, or mortgage without jeopardizing his right to apply the in-
stallment method.
Furthermore, he can immediately discount the purchaser's obligations
which are due in future periods. The proceeds will not be includable in the
initial payments since they do not constitute "payments received" from the
vendee.27 Any unliquidated encumbrances upon the property, whether as-
sumed by the vendee, are not included in the initial payments except to the
extent that the indebtedness exceeds the vendor's basis. 28
As an additional qualifying factor, there must be two payments, one
in the year of closing and one in a subsequent period. If there is no payment
in the year of closing, the transaction will not qualify for the installment
method even though subsequent payments extend over more than one tax-
able period. 21 But a down payment received in a prior period carries over
to the year of closing for purposes of the foregoing requirement and also in
applying'the thirty percent rule.30 Assume, for example, that the vendor con-
tracted in December,1951 to sell certain real estate for a consideration of
$20,000. He accepted a down payment of $1,000 and it was agreed that title
and possession would be transferred on February 1, 1952. If the balance of
the purchase price were paid on the closing date, the entire gain would be re-
ported in 1952. Nothing would be reportable in 1951, regardless of the tax-
payer's method of accounting, since the transaction was not closed in that
year. But assume that the balance of the purchase price were paid as follows:
$3,000 on the closing date in 1952, and $4,000 in each of the following four
years. In that event, the down payment made in December, 1951 would carry
over and the vendor would be deemed to have received a total initial pay-
ment of $4,000 in 1952, the year of closing. Since this amount is less than
25. INT. REv. CODE § 44(b).
26. Ibid.
27. Duram Bldg. Corporation v. Comm'r, 66 F. 2d 253 (2d Cir. 1933); U. S.
Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.44-2 (1943).
28. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.44-2 (1943); Burnett v. S & L Building Corpor-
ation, 288 U. S. 406 (1933).
29. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.44-2 (1943); G. C. M. 12148,'XII-2 CuM.
BULL. 57 (1933).
30. Newaygo Portland Cement Co., 27 B. T. A. 1097 (1933); Warren Na-
tional Bank, 22 B.T.A. 759 (1931), aff'd, 61 F. 2d 325 (3rd Cir. 1932).
19521
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307 of the total selling price, the transaction would qualify for the install-
ment method.
REPORTING LosSES
There are no alternative methods of reporting losses and both cash and
accrual basis taxpayers must take deductions for losses in the year in which
the sale is closed.8 At this point, special consideration should be given to
losses on the sale of real property used in a trade or business and held for
more than six months which qualify under Section 117(j). By the terms of
Section 117(j), a loss on the sale of such property may be fully deductible
from ordinary income. But there is a limitation upon the operation of this
rule. Any loss incurred must first be off-set against (a) gains on the sale or
exchange of other business property and (b) gains on the involuntary con-
version of both business property and capital assets. But these off-setting
gains are capital gains. Therefore, to obtain the maximum benefit of Section
117(j) losses, which are deductible in full from ordinary income, it is de-
sirable to shift these losses to a taxable period in which there are no off-
setting capital gains. This is a situation where the vendor may wish to resort
to his power to control the year of closing.
Another problem, closely related to Section 117(j) losses, involves the
net operating loss deduction provided in Section 122. The question arises
where the loss on the sale of real estate qualifies as an ordinary loss and
exceeds the income for the taxable period. For an individual taxpayer to
enjoy the benefits of the carry-back and carry-over provisions, the loss must
arise in the ordinary course of his business. Consequently, for losses on the
sale of real estate to qualify, the vendor must be a dealer. Thus it has been
held that losses on the sale of a farm, 82 a citrus fruit grove,33 and real estate
held for rental purposes3 4 do not constitute net operating losses under the
statute.
CHARACTER OF THE GAIN OR Loss
Reference has been made to profitable real estate transactions with-
out attempting to classify the gain as ordinary income or capital gain. It is
not within the scope of this article to attempt to resolve the difficult prob-
31. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(e)-i (1943).
32. Baruch v. Comm'r, 178 F. 2d 204 (2d Cir. 1949); Lazier v. United States,
170 F. 2d 521 (8th Cir. 1948).
33. Pettit v. Com'r, 175 F. 2d 195 (5th Cir. 1949).
34. Claudia N. S. Schamberg, 8 T. C. M. 609 (1949).
[Vol. 17
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1952], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol17/iss2/1
PRINCIPAL TAX CONSIDERATIONS
lems in this area. That topic deserves separate treatment. But the following
summary of applicable rules may provide a bit of perspective.
(1) If real property is held for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business, the gain thereon will be taxed as ordinary income and
any loss will constitute an ordinary business loss. The critical issue is
whether the vendor is to be considered a "dealer" in consummating the
particular transaction.
The factors to be considered have beeen summarized by one writer 5 to
include: (a) the frequency and continuity of the taxpayer's real estate
transactions; (b) the purpose of the original acquisition of the property;
(c) proximity of sale to purchase; and (d) the activity (participation) of
the vendor in the development, promotion, and sale of the property. It
should be noted, however, that the vendor cannot avoid classification as a
dealer by selling through agents, for such sales will be attributed to him.36
On the other hand, one who is regularly engaged in the real estate business
may hold investment property which will qualify under Section 117(j). 3
(2) If the property is real property used in a trade or business and
has been held for more than six months it falls within Section 117(j). Gain
thereon is taxable as capital gain and a loss is fully deductible as an ordi-
nary loss subject to the limitations stated in the statute. This classification
includes property acquired for business use38 and also investment real estate
held for the production of income.39
(3) If the property falls in neither of the foregoing classifications, it
will constitute a capital asset and a gain or loss will be reported as capital
gain or loss.
EXCHANGE OF REAL ESTATE
There is one real estate transaction to be noted which will produce
neither taxable gain nor deductible loss. Section 112(b)(1) provides that
if real estate "held for productive use in trade or business or for investment"
35. FINK, Dealing in Real Estate, 2 TAX L. REv. 111 (1946).
36. Ehrman v. Comm'r, 120 F. 2d 607 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314. U. S.
668 (1941).
37. Nelson A. Farry, 13 T. C. 8 (1949).
38. Alamo Broadcasting Company, Inc., 15 T. C. 534 (1950) (property
originally purchased for use in business but sold when subsequent circumstances
prevented such use).
39. Mary E. Crawford, 16 T. C. 678 (1951); George W. Carnrick, 9 T. C.
756 (1947), Acq., 1948-1 CUM. BULL. 1. Contra: Keneipp v. United States, 184
F. 2d 263 (D. C. Cir. 1950).
19521
9
Young: Young: Principal Tax Considerations
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1952
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
is exchanged for real estate "of a like kind" to be held for either of the same
purposes, no gain or loss shall be recognized. This may prove advantageous
to the taxpayer who wishes to liquidate one real estate investment and rein-
vest in other real estate. He may find a buyer who is in a position to make a
direct exchange. However, an indirect exchange is equally effective for the
statute has been applied where the vendor deeded his property to the buyer
and received in exchange a deed to other real estate from a third party pur-
suant to arrangements made by the buyer.40
One word of caution is appropriate in this transaction. The basis of
the original investment carries over as the basis of the property acquired
in the exchange.- Thus, in avoiding the realization of gain, the taxpayer
loses an opportunity to acquire a stepped-up basis for depreciation purposes.
The advantage on the one hand should be weighed against the disadvantage
on the other in deciding upon the exchange method of disposition.
FORM IN WHICH THE TRANSACTION IS CONSUMMATED
Lease With Option to Purchase. Most real estate transactions are con-
summated as immediate sales. But this is not always the case. There are
instances where the parties choose to cast the transaction in the form of a
lease with an option to purchase.42 The lease, in this event, provides that
upon exercise of the option to purchase the interim rental payments shall
be applied to the purchase price. From a tax standpoint, these transactions
should not be encouraged. As a sale, the transaction may not be considered
closed until the lessee-purchaser has exercised his option.43 In the meantime,
the rental payments which are to apply on the purchase price will be taxed
as ordinary income to the vendor-lessor. 4 If the transaction were an out-
right sale, in the first instance, the vendor would be entitled to recover his
basis, at least in part, before realization of any taxable gain. Furthermore,
the gain might well be capital gain and not ordinary income. The lessee-
purchaser is also at a disadvantage for he may have planned to deduct the
interim rental payments as ordinary business expenses. These rental pay-
40. W. D. Haden Co., 5 T. C. M. 251 (1946), aff'd, 165 F. 2d 588 (5th Cir.
1948).
41. INT. Rzv. CODE § 113(a)(6).
42. E.g., Robert A. Taft, 27 B.T.A. 808 (1933).
43. Compare Truman Bowen, 12 T.C. 446 (1949) (holding the transaction
an immediate sale), witl. Estate of Clarence B. Eaton, 10 T. 0. 869 (1948) (holding
the transaction a lease until exercise of the option to purchase).
44. Estate of Clarence B. Eaton, supra note 43.
[Vol. 17
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ments, however, generally prove to be capital expenditures by operation of
Section 23(a)(1)(A) which limits rental deductions to property "to which
the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no
equity."4
The risk incurred by the vendor in consummating a lease with option to
purchase is aptly illustrated by a recent case. 6 There the vendor entered
into a lease-purchase agreement which provided for a total consideration of
$125,000 of which $25,000 was paid on the effective date of the lease. The
lessee-purchaser was granted an option to purchase the property, exercis-
able within a period ending six months after the death of the lessor. The
sum of $100,000 was payable upon exercise of the option. The agreement
further provided for quarterly payments of $1,125 which represented interest
at the rate of 4/2 % per annum upon the unpaid balance. The lessee did not
exercise the option within the period provided by the agreement. The tax-
payer contended that the $25,000 was consideration for the option and was
not taxable until the option was exercised or forfeited. 47 But the Tax Court
held that the sum was taxable in the year of receipt as ordinary income
(apparently in the nature of rent) since it had been received by the taxpayer
under claim of right and without restriction upon its disposition. From the
language of the decision it appears that the same result would have been
reached even if the option had been subsequently exercised by the lessee.
Sale and Lease-back. Another transaction which has received consider-
able attention in recent years is the sale and lease-back.48 It has been
utilized for both financial and tax benefits and raises some interesting prob-
lems which have not been finally resolved. The usual arrangement consists
of a sale to an insurance company or charitable corporation which simulta-
neously leases the property to the vendor under a long-term lease. At first
blush it might seem that the gain or loss on the sale portion of the transac-
tion should be handled in the same manner as any other sale. But recent
45. Judson Mills, 11 T. C. 25 (1948).
46. Estate of Mary G. Gordon, 17 T. C. 427 (1951), appeal pending 6th Cir-
47. If the taxpayer had been successful in this contention, the payment
would have been taxable in the year of forfeiture as a short-term capital gain under
INT. REv. CODE § 117(g) (2). See discussion infra page 136.
48. For a complete analysis, see Cary, Corporate Financing Throug& the Sale
and Leaseback of Property; Business, Tax and Policy Considerations, 62 HAXv. L.
REv. 1 (1948); also, Cary, Current Tax Problems in Sale, or Gift, and Leaseback
Transactions, N.Y.U. 9th ANNUAL INsTrruTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 959 (1951),
reprinted in 29 TAxEs 662 (1951).
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decisions involving losses incurred in sale and lease-back transactions indi-
cate that this hasty conclusion does not follow. In two cases, the court
found that the sales were bona fide and held the losses deductible.49 It should
be noted that the leases were for periods of 20 and 25 years, respectively,
without renewal options. The duration of these leases was a determining
factor in the court's decisions. In two other cases the losses were disallowed
-one on the ground that the sale was not bona fide; 0 the other on the
ground that the transaction constituted an exchange of property of like
kind within Section 112(b) (1).51
The latter, the Century Electric Co. case, is the most significant. There
the taxpayer sold its property to an educational institution in 1943 at a loss
in excess of $380,000 and took back a 95-year lease. The transaction was
prompted by both financial and tax considerations, the latter being particu-
larly obvious since it was an excess profits tax year. In holding that the
transaction constituted an exchange with respect to which no loss could
be recognized, the court stressed the 95-year term of the lease-back. Re-
liance was placed upon a long standing provision in the Regulations that
"no gain or loss is recognized if ... a taxpayer who is not a dealer in real
estate exchanges a lease-hold of a fee with 30 years or more to run for real
estate.1152 By this provision, a lease-hold of 30 years or more is considered
the equivalent of a fee in applying the "like kind" test. On this basis it was
concluded that there was an exchange of the fee interest in the property for
an equivalent 95-year lease plus cash. The consideration received was ap-
plied in reduction of the basis which was held amortizable over the entire
95-year term of the lease.
The present status of the decisions leads to the conclusion that a sale
and lease-back transaction involving a lease of 30 years or more will be
classed as a Section 112(b)(1) exchange. No loss will be allowed and a
gain will be taxable in an amount not to exceed the cash (or other property)
received as boot. Furthermore, the adjusted basis will be amortizable over
the term of the lease irrespective of the useful life of the property. And
49. May Department Stores Co., 16 T. C. 547 (1951); Standard Envelope
Mfg. Co., 15 T. C. 41 (1950).
50. H. E. Harman Coal Corporation, 16 T. C. 787 (1951) (sidetracks having
a basis of $21,637.58 sold to railroad company for consideration of $1 and an agree-
ment for maintenance).
51. Century Electric Co., 15 T. C. 581 (1950), aff'd 192 F. 2d 155 (8th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied March 10, 1952, 5 CCH 1952 Fed. Tax Rep. p. 44, 102.52. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.112(b)(1)-i (1943).
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finally, there is the question of rental deductions yet to be settled. Future
litigation in this area will warrant careful attention.
Borrowing on the Security of Real Estate Without Personal Liability.
It is generally conceded that one does not realize income as a result of bor-
rowing. But a particular type of mortgage transaction, which has been
prevalent in recent years, has given rise to speculation, if not argument, as to
its proper tax consequences. It involves the situation where the owner ob-
tains a loan solely upon the security of the property in an amount in excess
of his basis. Recent inflationary trends have made this type of transaction
financially acceptable to lenders. It has been proposed that since- the owner
is under no obligation to repay the loan, he should be deemed to have
realized gain on the transaction to the extent that the proceeds exceed his
basis."a The suggested corollary to this result is that the basis of the
property should be increased by the amount of gain realized upon the
transaction.
In a recent decision,"4 the Tax Court refused to accept this proposi-
tion, and concluded that mortgaging property does not constitute a dispo-
sition within Section 111(a). It was the court's position that there could
be no gain realized solely as a consequence of the loan and mortgage unless
and until the mortgage was foreclosed and the property taken in satisfaction
of the debt. The immediate response, of course, is that from the standpoint
of neither the Government nor the taxpayer is the foreclosure of a mortgage
and loss of the property an advantageous time at which to assess a substan-
tial income tax upon the owner. But it is submitted that the Tax Court's
view is eminently sound. The possible disruptive economic consequences of
imposing an income tax upon a large volume of borrowing transactions would
seem to overshadow the risk of loss of revenue in the relatively few hard-
ship cases which arise where the loans cannot be repaid at maturity.
FAMILY TRANSACTIONS
The rapidly increasing dollar value of real estate during the past sev-
eral years has brought an increased consciousness of the impact of death
taxes upon real estate holdings. As a consequence, inter vivos transfers
53. Lurie, Mortgagors Gain on Mortgaging Property for More Than Cost
Without Personal Liability (Contentions of Taxpayer's Counsel in a Pending Case),
6 TAx L. Rzv. 319 (1951).
54. Woodsam Associates, Inc., 16 T. C. 649 (19$1), appeal pending 2nd Cir.
Here the taxpayer argued for application of the rule in order to establish a stepped-
up basis for purpose of determining gain upon foreclosure of the mortgage.
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have became more and more popular within family groups. However, many
of these transactions are consummated as sales, rather than as gifts, with
tax consequences which warrant careful consideration.
Bargain Sales. Perhaps you have had an optimistic client enthusiasti-
cally confront you with the perfect tax transaction. He owns certain real
estate which has a basis of $100,000 and a fair market value of $200,000. It is
his plan to sell the property to his son at a bargain price of $40,000. This
transaction, he happily announces, will shift the title of valuable property
to one who is the object of his bounty and at the same time provide him with
an income tax deduction of $60,000. His proposal is, of course, a fanciful
dream. In the first place, Section 24(b) prohibits the deduction of losses in-
curred on sales between related taxpayers. Secondly, the transaction in-
volves a taxable gift of $160,000, that being the excess of the fair market
value of the property over the stipulated consideration." And lastly, the
basis of the property in the hands of the son will be $40,000, the actual cash
consideration paid for the property. Although the transaction constitutes a
gift for gift tax purposes, it is deemed strictly a purchase and sale under
the income tax and no part of the father's basis would be carried over to
the son.5 7 Thus, the net result of the suggested transaction would be a
taxable gift of $160,000 and a reduction of $60,000 in the basis of the pro-
perty.
Sale in Consideration of an Agreement to Pay an Annuity. A device
frequently employed in family circles is a transfer of real estate in consider-
ation of the transferee's agreement to pay an annuity to the transferor."
If the value of the annuity is less than the fair market value of the property
transferred, there is a bargain sale with substantially the same tax conse-
quences as indicated above.50
55. "Related taxpayers" are defined with particularity in the statute and
include a husband, wife, brother, sister ancestor, lineal descendant, and a con-
trolled corporation.
56. INT. REv. CODE § 1002.
57. Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Comm'r, 160 F. 2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947), reversing 6
T. C. 652 (1946) (acquisition by inter vivos transfer under antenuptial contract);
cf. Mack v. Comm'r, 148 F. 2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1945), affirming 3 T. C. 390 (1944)
(acquisition by bargain purchase under provisions of a will). Contra: May Rogers,
31 B. T. A. 994 (1935), rev'd on other grounds, 107 F. 2d 394 (2d Cir. 1939).
58. It should be noted that an estate tax will not be avoided if the transfer-
or retains an interest in the property. Estate of Cornelia B. Schwartz, 9 T. C.
229 (1947).
59. For gift tax purposes, the value of the gift would be measured by the
difference between the actuarial value of the annuity and the fair market value
of the property transferred. Estate of Koert Bartman, 10 T. C. 1073 (1948).
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But the transaction may be bona fide and for an adequate and full con-
sideration. In that event, there is no taxable gift. The gain, if any, will be
recognized only after the transferor has fully recovered his basis.60 Consistent
with the principles discussed under accounting methods, the mere promise
of the obligor has no fair market value for purpose of determining gain on
the sale. 61 After basis has been recovered, the payments will be taxable in
full as ordinary income since the transaction is one involving the purchase
of an annuity by the transferor.62 This result is, of course, at variance with
that which follows the purchase of a commercial annuity.63
The basis (tax cost) of the property in the hands of the transferee-
purchaser presents an interesting problem which has not been fully resolved.
Treating the transaction as a purchase of property by the transferee, 64 the
original basis will be the discounted value of the annuity payments com-
puted actuarily as of the date of the transfer. 5 Original basis will be deter-
mined in this manner regardless of whether the transfer is for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth. This rule is consistent
with the requirement that cost generally determines the basis of property
and cost includes the purchaser's deferred payment obligations. The trans-
feror-annuitant's life span, however, will not square exactly with his life
expectancy. Consequently, subsequent adjustments to basis will be neces-
sary. Where the transferor dies prior to the expiration of his life expectancy,
the transferee's basis becomes the actual cost of the property to him rather
than the actuarial value of the annuity obligation.66 Where the transferor
60. Ware v. Comm'r, 159 F. 2d 542 (5th Cir. 1947).
61. Comm'r v. Kann's Estate, 174 F. 2d 357 (3rd Cir. 1949).
62. Ware v. Comm'r, supra note 60; Bella Hommel, 7 T. C. 992 (1946).
There is one case, however, in which the court treated a transfer in consideration
of an agreement to pay an annuity as two separate transactions: one as a sale of
property at a recognized gain reportable after recovery of basis; the other as the
purchase of an annuity at a cost measured by the value of the property trans-
ferred. Hill's Estate v. Maloney, 58 F. Supp. 164 (D. C. N. J. 1944).
63. For an analysis of the problem, see Note, Taxing Deferred Return Upon
Transfer of a Capital Asset, 63 HARv. L. REv. 853 (1950).
64. In a few early decisions the transferee was considered to have entered into
an annuity venture. Thus payments made to the transferor pursuant to the agree-
ment were considered partly a return of capital and partly the payment of interest
on the unpaid balance. E.g., Comm'r v. John C. Moore Corp., 42 F. 2d 186 (2d
Cir. 1930). But this theory has been discarded in the more recent decisions which
have adopted the view that the transaction is strictly a purchase of property by
the transferee. Gillespie & Sons Co. v. Comm'r, 154 F. 2d 913 (10th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 329 U. S. 781 (1946) and cases note 67 infra.
65. Nelson Trottman, 3 T. C. M. 316 (1944).
66. D. Bruce Forrester, 4 T. C. 907 (1945).
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lives beyond his life expectancy, there is a question as to whether the pay-
ments made thereafter by the transferee constitute deductible losses. For
the most part, it has been consistently held that these additional payments
are capital expenditures which are to be added to the transferee's basis.67
These adjustments, of course, present complications where there are depre-
ciable improvements upon the real estate or where the transferee disposes of
the property prior to the annuitant's death.
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY
Sale at a Gain. Section 112(n) was added to the Code by the Revenue
Act of 1951 to govern the gain on the sale of one's residence. Prior to this
admendment, gain on the sale of a residence was taxable as capital gain
even though the proceeds were immediately applied to the purchase of a
new home. Under the new provisions, which are mandatory in application,
no gain will be recognized if the proceeds are fully reinvested in a new home.
If the entire proceeds are not reinvested in a new home, gain on the sale of
the old home will be recognized to the extent that the sale price of the old
home exceeds the cost of the new home.8 The new rule is applicable only
to the sale and purchase of the taxpayer's "principal residence." It does not
apply, for example, to the sale and purchase of a summer home. But it is ap-
plicable to that portion of business property which is occupied as the tax-
payer's residence, such as a residence on a farm or an apartment in a store
building. As a corollary to the rule regarding non-recognition of gain, the
basis of the old residence carries over as the basis of the new residence.0
Similarly, the holding period of the old residence is tacked to the holding
period of the new residence.70
The statute prescribes certain time limitations upon the operation of
the new rule. Where the taxpayer purchases a new residence, the purchase
must be made within a year prior or subsequent to the sale of the old
home.71 Furthermore, the new home must be used as the taxpayer's resi-
dence not later than a year following the sale. Where the taxpayer con-
structs a new residence, construction must begin within a year and the pro-
67. Citizens Nat. Bank v. Comm'r, 122 F. 2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U. S. 822 (1942); Steinbach Kresge Co. v. Sturgess, 33 F. Supp. 897(D. N. J. 1940); A. H. Black Co., 3 T. C. C. M. 14 (1944).
68. INT. Rzv. CODE § 112(n) (1).
69. Id. § 112(n)(4).
70. Id. § 117(h)(7).
71. Id. § 112(n)(1).
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perty must be used as his residence within eighteen months following the
sale.72 If the taxpayer reconstructs another home as his new residence, the
reconstructed home must be occupied not later than a year following the
sale of the old home. 7
In applying these rules, the date of closing is very important? 4 If the
taxpayer sells his old home and purchases a new home, the sale and pur-
chase must both be closed tax-wise within a one year period. Assume that
the taxpayer sold his old home and delivered possession and title on February
1, 1951. On January 15, 1952 he contracted to purchase a new home. He
received title and possession of his new home on February 15, 1952. The
transaction would not qualify under the statute since more than a year
would have elapsed between the sale of the old home and purchase of the
new home.
Certain rules are applicable in determining reinvestment of the pro-
ceeds of the sale of the old home. The sale price of the old home and pur-
chase price of the new home include, of course, any deferred payments and
other obligations or encumbrances assumed, respectively, by the purchaser
and the taxpayer. Commissions on the sale of the old residence are not
deducted in determining the sale price of the old residence, but expenses
incurred in the acquisition of the new home are added to the cost of pur-
chase. 75 Capital expenditures made upon the new home within the above
mentioned time limits are also included as a part of the purchase price.78
Capital expenditures beyond the statutory period are excluded. The value
of inherited or gift property is also excluded from the cost of purchasing
the new home since acquisition in this manner does not actually involve a
reinvestment of proceeds from the sale of the old home. But excluded
capital expenditures and the basis of inherited and gift property are in-
cluded in determining the basis of the new home.
The new statutory provisions apply to exchanges and involuntary con-
versions as well as sales and purchases.77 In the case of a direct exchange of
residences, boot paid by the taxpayer would increase the basis of the new
72. Id.§ 112(n)(G).
73. Id. § 112(n) (2) (D).
74. The statute does not define the meaning of "sale" and "purchase" as used
in § 112(n). It would follow therefore, that these terms are to have the same
meaning as in other sale transactions. See discussion supra pages 117-118.
75. SEN. REP. No. 781, Pt. 2, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1951).
76. INr. REv. CODE § 112(n) (2) (D).
77. Id. § 112(n)(2)(A) and (B).
1952]
17
Young: Young: Principal Tax Considerations
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1952
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
home and boot received would result in taxable gain. The rule for non-
recognition of gain is applicable only to one sale in a given twelve month
period with an exception allowed in the case of involuntary conversion.8 The
rule does not apply where the taxpayer purchases a new residence and sells
it prior to the sale of his old residence.79 Similarly, if the taxpayer purchases
and uses more than one new residence within a year following the sale of
his old residence, only the residence last purchased will constitute a new
residence under the statute.80 To take advantage of the new rule it is not
necessary in the case of husband and wife that title to the new residence
be held in the same form as title to the old residence.81
Sale at a Loss. The new statutory provision does not alter the rule
that a loss on the sale of one's residence is in the nature of a personal ex-
pense and is not deductible. s2 But this restriction upon the deduction of
losses does not apply where the taxpayer has converted his residence into
rental property. In that event the property will be classed as used in a trade
or business within the provisions of Section 117(j) and a loss on a subsequent
sale will be fully deductible.83 In determining the loss, the basis is the lesser
of cost or fair market value at the date of conversion, less depreciation
during the rental period.8 4 To convert one's residence to rental property,
the decisions generally require actual renting. Merely vacating one's resi-
dence and listing it for sale or rent is insufficient. A loss in these circum-
stances will be disallowed.85
A different rule applies to an inherited residence not occupied by the
taxpayer. In that case actual renting is not a condition precedent to the
deduction of a loss on a subsequent sale. Merely holding the property for
sale or rent will serve to convert the residence into property used in a trade
78. Id. 112(n)( 3).
79. Id. § 112(n) (2) (E).
80. Id. § 112(n) (2) (F).
81. Id. § 112(n)( 6 ).
82. This rule was strictly applied in a recent case where the taxpayer sold
two residences during the taxable year-the first at a gain, the second at a loss.
The taxpayer contended that he should be permitted to off-set the loss against
the gain and report only the net gain from the two sales. The Tax Court rejected
this contention on the ground that each transaction must be considered separately
and that the loss on the second sale constituted a non-deductible personal, living
expense. Richard P. Koehn, 16 T. C. 1378 (1951).
83. Heiner v. Tindle, 276 U. S. 582 (1928); U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23 (e)-1(1943).
84. Quincy A. Shaw McKean, 6 T. C. 757 (1946).
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or business8 6 But it has recently been held that listing only "for sale," as
contrasted with a listing "for sale or rent," does not convert an inherited
residence into real property used in a trade or business.8 7 The loss, in the
former instance, was restricted to a capital loss.
When the taxpayer's residence is in a cooperative apartment, no de-
duction will be allowed for a loss incurred upon the sale of his interest
therein.88 The loss does not arise out of a transaction entered into for profit
and is also considered a personal, living expense. But if the taxpayer has
subleased his apartment and converted it to rental property, a loss on a
subsequent sale will be allowed. In that case, however, the loss may be
attributed solely to the stock in the corporation and treated as a long-term
capital loss.8 9
PROPERTY TAXES AND THE SALE OF REAL ESTATE
A problem, which has caused some difficulty relates to current property
taxes which have become a lien or personal obligation of the vendor prior
to sale. It is customary for the parties to allocate these taxes on the basis
of their respective periods of possession during the year of closing or in some
comparable manner. As held in Magruder v. Supplee,90 the portion assumed
by the vendee constitutes an additional capital expenditure or cost of the
property and is not deductible by the purchaser in determining taxable
income. It follows, as a corollary to this rule, that the payment made by
the purchaser must be treated by the vendor as additional consideration re-
ceived for the property and reported as part of the selling price. However,
the vendor is entitled to take a deduction for the total amount of the taxes
including the portion assumed and paid by the vendee.91 This may provide
a substantial tax benefit where the gain on the sale is a capital gain, for the
property taxes may be deductible in full from ordinary income.
86. N. Stuart Campbell, 5 T. C. 272 (1945).
87. Maria Assman Estate, 16 T. C. 632 (1951) (listed "for sale"; loss a
capital loss); Mary E. Crawford, 16 T.C. 678 (1951) (listed "for sale or rent";
loss an ordinary loss).
88. John H. Amen, 7 T. C. M. 577 (1948).
89. Junius B. Peake, 10 T. C. M. 579 (1951). Court, in effect, found the lease
to be worthless at the time of conversion to rental property; loss was, therefore,
limited to the stock in the cooperative corporation.
90. 316 U. S. 394 (1942). The rule adopted by this decision is wholly un-
realistic. Both the vendor and vendee look upon current property taxes as current
operating expenses applicable to their respective periods of possession. An amend-
ment of Internal Revenue Code § 23(c) to authorize deduction of current property
taxes on the basis of a reasonable allocation by the parties is warranted.
91. Norman Cooledge, 40 B. T. A. 1325 (1939), Acq., 1940-1 Cum. BULL. 2.
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BREACH OF CONTRACT AND FORFEITURES
Real estate transactions which have been duly and fully executed have
been the principal subject of this discussion. But those transactions which
fail to bear fruit as originally anticipated also warrant comment. A typical
situation involves the option contract. Many real estate transactions are
initiated under option agreements which provide that the consideration for
the option shall apply on the purchase price in the event the option is ex-
ercised. For the vendor, the transaction is not closed tax-wise until the option
has either expired or has been exercised. If it is exercised, the closing does
not occur until delivery of a deed or transfer of possession.92 But if allowed
to expire, the consideration received therefor is reportable as income in the
period of expiration. 93 The reason for the delay in taking up the considera-
tion for the option as income is the fact that the true nature of the payment
cannot be determined until expiration or exercise as the case might be.04
By specific statutory provision, the gain upon forfeiture is treated as a
short-term capital-gain and, conversely, the optionee is allowed a short-
term capital loss.93
A similar problem arises where the vendee executes a binding contract
to purchase and makes a down payment, but subsequently fails to perform.
If the down payment is forfeited as liquidated damages without litigation,
the gain will be reportable in the year of forfeiture."" But the vendor may
tender merchantable title and bring suit for specific performance. That
raises another interesting question. If the taxpayer is on a cash basis, no
gain will be reportable until successful conclusion of the suit and receipt
of the purchase price. If the taxpayer is on an accrual basis, there is a
conflict of authority as to whether the transaction is closed in the year in
which the vendor tenders a deed9" or in a subsequent period when a decree
of specific performance is rendered. 9s The latter would seem to be the
better view since there can be no certainty that the transaction will be
consummated until the litigation has been concluded.
92. Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co., 281 U. S. 11 (1930).
93. Hunter v. Comm'r, 140 F. 2d 954 (5th Cir. 1944).
94. Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Comm'r, 99 F. 2d 919 (4th Cir. 1938);
C. V. L. Corporation, 17 T. C.-No. 95 (1951).
95. INT. REv. CODE § 117(g) (2).
96. Doyle v. Comm'r, 110 F. 2d 157 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S.
658 (1940).
97. Comm'r v. Northern Jersey Title Ins. Co., 79 F. 2d 492 (3rd Cir. 1935).
98. Doyle v. Comm'r, supra note 96.
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In this connection another point should be noted. By contrast with
forfeitures under option agreements, there is no statute governing forfeitures
by default under contracts for the sale of real estate. Consequently it has
been held that the amount forfeited is taxable to the vendor as ordinary in-
come since the gain did not arise from a "sale or exchange." 9
It would apparently follow that the loss to a defaulting purchaser should
be deductible as an ordinary loss where the transaction arose in the opera-
tion of a trade or business or was entered into for profit. But in a recent
case the Tax Court refused to adopt this view.100 There the taxpayer enter-
ed into a contract to purchase a lot which required a down payment of
$2,000. It was provided that in the event of the purchaser's default on the
date set for closing, the vendor could elect between a forfeiture of the down
payment and a suit for specific performance. The purchaser defaulted and
the vendor, by letter, threatened to institute a suit for specific performance.
But an action did not materialize and the taxpayer deducted his forfeited
down payment as an ordinary loss. The Tax Court sustained the Commis-
sioner in limiting the deduction to a short-term capital loss. The court
reasoned that the taxpayer had acquired an equitable interest in the
property under a binding contract. If this interest was transferred to the
vendor in consideration of a termination of his obligation under the con-
tract, there was a sale or exchange. In the instant case, it was concluded
that the taxpayer's evidence had not negatived the existence of a subse-
quent agreement by which he relinquished his interest in the property to
the vendor. As authority for its position the court erroneously relied on cases
where the vendee in possession under a closed contract of sale transferred
the property to the vendor in satisfaction of the unpaid balance of the pur-
chase priceY°" Those decisions are sound in treating the vendee's loss in the
particular circumstances as one arising from a "sale "or exchange." There
had been an original closed transaction (sale) in those cases. But where
a forfeiture occurs in a transaction which does not constitute a "sale or
exchange" by the vendor, it is difficult to justify a conclusion that, never-
theless, a "sale or exchange" has been consummated by the purchaser. At
99. United States v. National City Bank of New York, 21 Fed. Supp. 791
(S. D. N. Y. 1937).
100. Fred A. Bihlmaier, 17 T. C. 620 (1951).
101. C. L. Gransden & Co., 39 B. T. A. 985 (1939), aff'd, 117 F. 2d 80 (6th
Cir. 1941); Harold R. Smith, 39 B. T. A. 892 (1939); Betty Rogers, 37 B. T. A.
897 (1938), aff'd, 103 F. 2d 790 (9th Cir. 1939).
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no time, in the established tax sense of the term, is there a sale (closed
transaction) by the vendor to the vendee. Consequently, the purchaser's
forfeited payment should be classified as ordinary income to the vendor and
as an ordinary loss to the vendee.
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